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Abstract of THE EMERGENCE OF OPERATIONAL ART FOR SPACE: IS IT TIME FOR ANOTHER MITCHELL OR MAHAN?
Operational art for space was thrust upon the U.S. military for the first time with the execution of Desert Storm. The conduct of space operations as directed by USCINCSPACE during the Gulf War, and subsequent changes in military organizations, training and education point to the emergence and beginning evolutions of space operational art much as it happened for sea and air power. By categorizing the operational utility of military power for a specific medium into four historical stages, the emergence and evolution of sea and air power are traced and then applied to space. Given the identifiable characteristics of each stage with respect to technology, societal views and military thinking, it is clear that the development of space operational art is at the same stage as sea power was before WWI and air power during the early interwar period. Given this understanding, the lack of space theory and doctrine before Desert Storm is expected and consistent with the corresponding level of technology and societal hesitation towards military space. However, Desert Storm ushered in
Introduction
Desert Storm, commonly referred to as the first space war, catapulted the strategically focused space power of the United States onto the operational arena. Many have written since then on the lack of theory, doctrine and operational art for space. Just as operational art emerged for the mediums of land, sea and air power, and then evolved, so too will it for space. The question now, seven years after Desert Storm, is has space operational art emerged and if so, where is it in the emergence process. The answer to these questions looms ever more important as the United States begins another critical juncture in the development of space power. Looming on the near horizon is what some are calling a need .
for a national debate on the militarization of space to ensure space dominance. 1 Juxtaposing the historical emergence of sea and air power with the current state of space power development and operational art will provide a historical foundation. For a clear understanding of where space operational art is and where it needs to go will better prepare the military for both the debate on militarization of space and, more importantly, the application of space power to the next war.
This paper will concentrate on answering three questions. The first is has operational art emerged for space power. Milan Vego suggests the emergence of operational art will result in changes in the conduct of war, military organizations, military education, and military training. 2 Through an examination of these four areas with respect to space power, the answer to the first question will be deduced. The next question is if space operational art has emerged, where is it in the emergence process. An examination of the emergence process for sea and air power will identify distinct stages and common factors which through juxtapositioning will pinpoint the current state of space operational art emergence. Finally,
given the above historical analysis and conclusions, the answer to what future impediments to the development of space operational art lie ahead and actions required to overcome them will be suggested, to include answering the question imbedded into the title of this paper.
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Has Space Operational Art Emerged?
The evaluation of whether space operational art has emerged begins with a need to understand what operational art is. However, given the scope and complexity of the subject, a common definition is difficult to find agreement on. 3 In its broadest form, operational art is one of the three components of military art, bridging the gap, albeit with some overlap, between the other two; strategy and tactics. 4 Given this general understanding, a brief examination of the changes with respect to space on the conduct of war and military organization, education and training will be used to evaluate whether or not space operational art has emerged.
Conduct of War
Both theory and doctrine reflect how the military views the conduct of war. Doctrine is generally based on the study and analysis of experience, i.e. what has usually worked best in the past. However, when those experiences are lacking, it may also rely on theory. Both are important as Milan Vego advises that theory is critical to operational art providing a sound basis for improvisation. 5 From a space power perspective, it is even more so given the lack of historical experiences.
Since Desert Storm and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a reinvigoration of developing doctrine to include space doctrine at both the joint and service levels. Joint Doctrine 3-14, Space Operations, is in development and work on an Air Force operational level space doctrine, AFDD 2-2, is ongoing. In 1995, the Army published FM 
Military Organization
In today's military structure, the primary domain for operational art is at the Unified is the military's reliance as great on the commercial sector as with space. Given shrinking budgets and the high costs of space assets, DoD's Space Architect is leading the evaluation effort to achieve the right mix of commercial'assets into the military forces. 15 The operational commander now faces the dilemma controlling commercial space assets that he is reliant upon and also denying those assets to the adversary. It is clear that while the organizational foundations are in place to support space operational art, it has yet to be optimized.
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Military Education
One of the significant observations made after Desert Storm was the lack of experience U.S. forces had with space support, at both the tactical and operational levels. Desert Storm and will continue to evolve based on the thoughts of space power advocates, many who are listed in this paper's bibliography. To further facilitate this evolution, in 1996, USCINCSPACE created an annual "Operational Art of Space Warfare" essay contest.
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Much as operational art for the sea and air emerged within the bowels of war and then evolved over time, so has space power.
What Stage is Space Power Development At?
An analysis of factors impacting the emergence of sea and air power will illuminate the sometimes nebulous path space operational art development seems to be on. Although there are many factors to choose from, the following three dominant factors were selected; technology, society to include both public support and national leadership, and military thinking.
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The emergence and subsequent evolution of operational art is not constant but progresses through distinct stages. This paper will utilize Colin Gray's four stages of strategic utility for military power, but evaluated from an operational rather than strategic perspective. 21 The three factors of technology, society and military thinking will be examined for both sea and air power against Gray's four stages:
(1) Experimental/marginal adjunct to terrestrial forces Stage three also corresponds to an ability for that medium, e.g. sea, air or space, through the misapplication of operational art, to lose the war, yet is still unable to win the war independently.
Stage four is difficult to characterize since it is doubtful that any medium will be so dominant as to become an independent war winner. It would require such a leap in technology that it would constitute a true revolution in military warfare.
Stage One Synopsis: Experimental/Marginal Adjunct to Terrestrial Forces.
Stage one for sea power begins in 1880 with naval forces transitioning from sail to steam. New technologies of efficient steam engines, lighter steel armor, wireless telegraph and advances in gunnery enabled the potential for modern blue-water combat force operations. 22 Alfred Mahan's dominated naval theory with his concepts of sea control and maritime national wealth. The beginning of the period was marked by a nation still committed to naval coastal defense and reluctant to embrace expansionism. 23 By the end however, society was leaning toward a new imperialism marked by the war with Spain in 1898 and the validation of the naval transition from passive defense to offensive sea control. Ostfriesland. 27 The American public's endorsement of military air power was facilitated by books written by Mitchell, Arnold and De Seversky and accompanied by a rapid expansion in commercial aviation. At the conclusion of WWII, air power was equated with American prestige and despite the debate on the significance of strategic bombing, air power had proven its indispensable nature to the American way of war.
Stage Three Synopsis: Indispensable Adjunct
Stage three for sea power begins with WWI and the vital need to maintain control of the sea lines of communications. The advent of air and subsurface technologies challenged naval doctrine and strategy based on a surface naval power second to none. Given the expansion of multiple roles and missions, the projected costs of fully developing sea power loomed ominous, with the potential for an escalating naval arms race. American society was cautious, leading to the Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922. 28 Subsequently, the Navy developed military capabilities to exploit all the varying aspects of the sea medium to include surface, air and subsurface, always driving technology and doctrine towards stage four and the ability to become an independent war winner. However, after nearly eight decades of pursuing stage four, the current strategy of Forward from the Sea and littoral warfare has firmly entrenched naval power in stage three.
Stage three for air power begins in the aftermath of WWII and the importance of air superiority and the massive strategic bombing air operations. Just as with sea power, the drive for air power to be an independent war winner drove the technology and doctrine to support strategic bombing with intercontinental bombers and nuclear weapons. 
What Lies Ahead For Space Operational Art?
Stage two for space demands requirements that if not addressed, will have serious consequences compared to the those of stage one. The extended period of stage one for space proved frustrating to many budding space visionaries whose call for theory and doctrine went unanswered, dating back to the Military Space Doctrine Symposium held in 1981. 30 From an operational perspective, the lack of doctrine, operational art, technology, public support, and national leadership for military space in stage one was normal, given the marginal role it played in operational warfare. 31 Desert Storm however, just as the war with Spain did for sea power and WWI did for air power, transitioned space into stage two, enabling serious debate and subsequent development of substantiated doctrine and operational art to begin.
Accompanying this is the public awareness level and commercial industry development consistent with stage two. Just as Mahan and Mitchell rallied public and/or national leadership support, tying the prestige and power of the United States to sea and air power development, so to must space power. Space power has become an important adjunct to terrestrial warfare and will quickly transition to stage three as an indispensable adjunct.
General Howell Estes III, USCINCSPACE, recently stated, "Our actions regarding space over these next few years will set the course for the next quarter century..." 32 The changes made since the Gulf War have ensured space operational art will be effectively executed for 
